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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), as
amended, and Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Is the Board of Education of Davis County School District
entitled to immunity for plaintiff's negligence claims in which
the alleged injury arose out of an alleged intentional assault
and battery?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

This matter was before the trial court

on a motion to dismiss. Because this issue raises only questions
of law, the Court should give the trial court's ruling no
deference and review it under a correctness standard.
Logan v. Utah Power & Light Co..

City of

796 P.2d 697 (Utah 1990).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1989):
Except as may be otherwise provided in this
chapter, all governmental entities are immune
from suit for any injury which results from
the exercise of a governmental function,
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home,
or other governmental health care facility,
and from an approved medical, nursing, or
other professional health care clinical
training program conducted in either public
or private facilities.
The management of flood waters and other
natural disasters and the construction,
repair, and operation of flood and storm
systems by governmental entities are
considered to be governmental functions, and
governmental entities and their officers and
employees are immune from suit for any injury
or damage resulting from those activities.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1990):
Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an
employee committed within the scope of
employment except if the injury arises out
of:
(1) the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, whether or not the
discretion is abused;
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution,
intentional trespass, abuse of process,
libel, slander, deceit, interference with
contract rights, infliction of mental
anguish, or civil rights;
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or
revocation of or by the failure or refusal to
issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit,
license, certificate, approval, order, or
similar authorization;
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by
making an inadequate or negligent inspection
of any property;
(5) the institution or prosecution of any
judicial or administrative proceeding, even
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if malicious or without probable cause;
(6) a misrepresentation by the employee
whether or not it is negligent or
intentional;
(7) or results from riots, unlawful
assemblies, public demonstrations, mob
violence, and civil disturbances;
(8) or in connection with the collection of
and assessment of taxes;
(9) the activities of the Utah National
Guard;
(10) the incarceration of any person in any
state prison, county or city jail, or other
place of legal confinement;
(11) any natural condition on state lands or
as the result of any activity authorized by
the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(12) research or implementation of cloud
management or seeding for the clearing of
fog; or
(13) the activities of:
(a) providing emergency medical assistance;
(b) fighting fire;
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling
hazardous materials or hazardous wastes;
(d) emergency evacuations; or
(e) intervening during dam emergencies.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case

Plaintiff, Donald Petersen, brought this action against
Alema Teo and the defendant-appellant Board of Education.
Plaintiff alleged that he was assaulted and battered by Alema
Teo, an employee of the Board of Education.

Plaintiff further

alleged that the appellant Board of Education was negligent; in
hiring and retaining Alema Teo, in its employees failing to
prevent or intervene in the assault and battery committed by
their co-worker, and, in failing to provide adequate security.
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Defendant Board of Education moved to dismiss this action as
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to itself on the basis of governmental immunity.

The trial court

denied this motion in its decision of February 26, 1992.
Defendant Board of Education petitioned this Court for permission
to file the instant interlocutory appeal on March 17, 1992. By
Order dated April 13, 1992, this Court granted the Board of
Education an interlocutory appeal.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Because this action is before the Court on the trial court's
denial of Defendant Board of Education's motion to dismiss, the
following factual allegations are those contained in the
plaintiff's complaint.
1.

Defendant Alema Teo is an employee of the Defendant

Board of Education of Davis County School District.

(R. 3, para.

7).
2.

Shortly before the end of a basketball game between

Woods Cross and Bountiful High Schools, a spectator (Scott
Rodrick) and Alema Teo (the announcer for the game) had an
altercation.
3.

(R. 3-4, para. 13-16).

Rodrick made several comments to Teo, and Teo either

shoved or struck Rodrick.
4.

(R. 3-4).

Plaintiff alleges that Teo "touched the person of the

plaintiff in a harmful, unwelcome and/or offensive manner and/or
put plaintiff in apprehension that he would be so touched, to
wit: Teo grabbed plaintiff's arm and yanked him from where he
stood in the stands to the floor of the basketball court."
4, para. 18).
4

(R.

5.

Petersen further alleges that Teo then struck the

plaintiff, on the left side of Petersen's head, knocking Mr.
Petersen unconscious.
6.

(R. 4, para. 19).

Mr. Petersen has not alleged any injuries other than

those suffered as a result of the assault and battery he claims
to have suffered at the hands of Alema Teo.
7.

Plaintiff Donald Petersen's complaint contains three

causes of action against the Board of Education.

First, Petersen

alleges that the Board was negligent in hiring and retaining an
employee who would commit assault and battery.

(R. 5-6, para.

25-28).
8.

Second, Petersen alleges that the Board was negligent in

the failure of its employees (identified as John Does I-V) to
intervene and protect the plaintiff from the assault and battery
committed by Teo, a fellow employee of the Board of Education.
(R. 6-7, para. 32-33) .
9.

Petersen's third cause of action against the Board

alleges that the Board was negligent in not providing adequate
security to prevent the alleged assault and battery.

(R. 7,

para. 37-38).
10.

Petersen's final cause of action alleges assault and

battery against Defendant Alema Teo.

(R. 8, para. 42).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff claims that he was assaulted and battered by Alema
Teo, an employee of the Board of Education.

While plaintiff

alleges three causes of action against the Board of Education for
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various kinds of negligence, all of the claimed injury arises out
of the alleged assault and battery.
Plaintiff admits that the challenged actions of the Board of
Education are a governmental function.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-

10(2) (1990) expressly retains the immunity of governmental
entities for negligence where the injury arises out of assault
and battery.

The crucial question is from what act the injury

arises, and not what type of negligence is alleged to have led to
the injury causing action.
Given this clear retention of immunity for injuries arising
out of assault and battery, the trial court erred when it denied
the Board of Education's motion to dismiss.
ARGUMENT
I. DEFENDANT BOARD OF EDUCATION HAS NOT
WAIVED ITS IMMUNITY FOR INJURIES ARISING OUT
OF ASSAULT AND BATTERY
This Court has applied a three step approach to determining
whether or not immunity is applicable to a specific case. The
first step is to determine whether the activity performed by the
entity is a governmental function.

The Utah Governmental

Immunity Act grants immunity to governmental entities in their
exercise of governmental functions. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3
(1989)•

In the instant action, plaintiff has conceded that the

claims against the Board of Education arise from what is "clearly
a governmental function."

(R. 44).

The second step requires a determination of whether there is
a waiver of immunity.

If such a waiver exists, the third step
6

involves a determination regarding any exceptions to the waiver.
The Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, et
seq., does not contain a waiver of immunity for intentional torts
(such as assault and battery) of government employees. Alema Teo
has been named as a party to this action and recovery can be had
from him if he is found to have performed the intentional torts
of assault and battery.
The only waiver that might apply in the instant action is
the waiver of immunity for the negligent acts or omissions of an
employee found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30 l r '1990).
But this waiver of immunity is suLjcCL to numerous
exceptions.

One of those exceptions retains the Board of

Education's immunity "if the injury arises out of: assault,
battery."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (1990).

That exception was before this Court in Maddocks v. Salt
Lake Citv Corp.. 740 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987).

Maddocks was an

action against Salt Lake City by a man who alleged that he had
been wrongfully arrested by three city police officers, one of
whom unlawfully beat the plaintiff while the others failed to
intervene. Maddocks sought to avoid the retention of immunity
for assault, battery, false imprisonment and false arrest that is
contained in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (1990), by couching his
claim as one of negligence for the failure of the fellow officers
to intervene to prevent the assault and battery.
In affirming the trial court's conclusion that the
negligence claim was barred by the Governmental Immunity Act,
7

this Court explained:
Plaintiff's phrasing of the claim against
Salt Lake City as one for negligence does not
bring it within the category of claims for
which immunity is waived. Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-10 (1986) waives governmental immunity
w
for injury proximately caused by a negligent
act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment." Immunity
is, however, restored for negligent acts
arising out of "assault, battery, false
imprisonment [or] false arrest." Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (b) (1986). We think that
Plaintiff's negligence claim arises out of
battery and false imprisonment and is
therefore not the sort of claim for which
immunity has been waived.
Id. at 1340. The instant action cannot be distinguished from
Maddocks.

In the instant action, Petersen's second cause of

action against the Board of Education is the very same claim that
the government entity was negligent because its employees failed
to intervene and prevent the assault and battery allegedly
committed by their co-worker.
Petersen's claim of negligent hiring and retention, and his
claim alleging failure to provide adequate security, both fail
for the same reason.

All of the injuries claimed by Petersen

arise out of the alleged assault and battery.

For this reason

the Board of Education's immunity has not been waived regardless
of the particular negligence plaintiff might allege.
Connell v. Tooele Citv. 572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977), involved a
clerk who negligently failed to recall an erroneous bench
warrant.

Because of this error, Connell was wrongly arrested and

imprisoned.

This Court held that the city was entitled to

immunity because the very "gist and essence" of the action was
8

the false arrest and imprisonment.
Although plaintiff's complaint alleges
negligence of the clerk in keeping her books,
we are of the opinion that all of the
injuries claimed by plaintiff arise out of
one of the excepted torts set forth in
Section 63-30-10(2) .
Id. at 698-699.

The Board of Education is entitled to

governmental immunity for any alleged negligence of its employees
where the injury arises out of assault and battery.
The particular act of negligence that a plaintiff may allege
is not determinative of whether or not governmental immunity
applies.

The salient question is out of what act the complained

of injuries arose.
In Gillman v. Dept. of Financial Institutions, 782 P.2d 506
(Utah 1989)# a bankruptcy trustee brought suit against the State
based upon various types of negligence on the part of state
employees.

This Court looked beyond the particular types of

negligence that were alleged and found that the State was
entitled to immunity because the claims asserted were all for
injuries arising out of licensing decisions for which immunity
was retained by § 63-30-10(3).
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10) (1990) provides a similar
exception to immunity for negligence when the injury arises out
of "the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county
or city jail, or other place of legal confinement."

Madsen v.

State. 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978), was a wrongful death action
against the State of Utah from the heirs of an inmate who died
following surgery.

This Court, holding that the State of Utah
9

was immune under § 63-30-10, explained that the plain meaning of
the phrase arising out of incarceration was to retain immunity
for any injuries occurring while the incarcerated person was in
prison and under the control of the state.
In Eotincr v. State. 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976) the State of
Utah was held to be immune from suit when a work release inmate
murdered the plaintiff's mother.

More recently, in Kirk v.

State, 784 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the Court of
Appeals held that the arising out of incarceration exception
barred a bailiff's negligence action against the State for
injuries inflicted by a prison inmate attempting to escape.
There is no reason to read the retention of immunity for
injuries arising out of assault and battery any narrower than the
courts of Utah have read the immunity for injuries arising out of
false arrest, false imprisonment, licensing or incarceration.
That the trial court did just that was erroneous.
Plaintiff's claimed injuries all arose out of the alleged
assault and battery committed by Alema Teo.

For this reason, the

Board of Education is entitled to governmental immunity and the
trial court erred in not granting the Board's motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in denying the Board of Education of
Davis County School District's motion to dismiss.

The Board is

entitled to governmental immunity because the challenged injury
arises out of assault and battery, for which immunity has been
retained.

For these reasons Defendant-Appellant Board of
10

Education asks this Court to reverse the trial court and order
this action dismissed with prejudice as it relates to this
Defendant.
Respectfully submitted this

/

day of June, 1992•

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Utah Attorney General

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Board of Education
of Davis County School District
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DONALD PETERSEN,
Plaintiff,
VS.

ALEMA TEO, an individual,
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF DAVIS
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, a body
corporate, and JOHN DOES I-V,
individuals,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT BOARD OF EDUCATION
OF DAVIS COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION
Civil No. 910750444
Judge Rodney S. Page

Defendants.
The Court having reviewed Defendant Board of Education of
Davis County School District's (Hereinafter "D.C.S.D.") Motion to
Dismiss For Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and the Memoranda
submitted in support of and in opposition to that Motion, the Court
having rendered its decision, now makes the following Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about February 14, 1991, Plaintiff was at

Woods Cross Senior High School in order to observe a sporting event

e: \*»S\PIZAB XNOVrtTXMtN. PP2

between teams from Woods Cross Senior High School and Bountiful
Senior High School.
2.

Plaintiff's

Complaint

at paragraphs

18

and 19

alleges that Defendant Teo, an employee of D.C.S.D. who had been
announcing the basketball game, touched the person of Plaintiff in
a harmful, unwelcome and/or offensive manner and/or put Plaintiff
in apprehension that he would be so touched, to wit:

Teo grabbed

Plaintiff's arm and yanked him from where he stood in the stands to
the floor of the basketball court, and Teo struck Plaintiff on and
about the left side of his face and head, knocked him unconscious,
and caused him to fall to the floor and strike his head.
3.

The First Cause of Action of Plaintiff's Complaint

alleges D.C.S.D. negligently hired and retained Teo and breached
its duty to hire and retain qualified employees pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. $ 53A-6-105 (1953 as amended), and that this breach was
a direct and proximate cause of the claimed injuries.
4.

The Second Cause of Action of Plaintiff's Complaint

alleges D.C.S.D. breached its duty to Plaintiff by negligently
failing to intervene and protect Plaintiff from Teo's violent acts,
and that this breach was a direct and proximate cause of the
claimed injuries.
5.

The Third Cause of Action of Plaintiff's Complaint

alleges D.C.S.D. breached its duty to Plaintiff to provide adequate
Ci\Ma\ri.tA&xiio\rtTE*tiN.rr2
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security for Plaintiff, a spectator, and that this breach was a
direct and proximate cause of the claimed Injuries.
6.

The Fourth Cause of Action of Plaintiff's Complaint

alleges a cause of action for assault and battery against Defendant
Teo.
7.

The Fifth Cause of Action of Plaintiff's Complaint

alleges that Defendant
malicious,

and

Teo was negligent,

recklessly

disregarded

grossly

Plaintifffs

negligent,
health

and

safety.
8.

Defendant D.C.S.D.'s Motion to Dismiss was based

upon its immunity from suit pursuant to the Governmental Immunity
Act, Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-1 et seq., particularly S 63-3010(l)(b), (1953 as amended).
9.

Plaintiff failed to file an Undertaking as required

by Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-19 (1953 as amended).
10.

Defendant D.C.S.D.'s Motion to Dismiss was also

based upon Plaintiff's failure to file an Undertaking pursuant to
the above-referenced statute.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court enters the
following Conclusions of Law:
1.

The First, Second and Third Causes of Action of the

Complaint regarding D.C.S.D.'s negligent hiring and retention of
C:\SlS\FLSADXHG\PtTEftSEN.rr2
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Teo, negligent failure to intervene, and negligent failure to
provide adequate security, are not barred by the Governmental
Immunity

Act pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-1 et seq..

particularly S 63-30-10(1)(b) (1953 as amended).
2.

Plaintiff's

failure

to

file

an Undertaking

as

required by Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-19 will not bar Plaintiff's
suit; however, if Plaintiff desires to proceed with this lawsuit he
must file a $300.00 undertaking as required by statute within
fifteen days of the date hereof.
ORDER
From the foregoing Findings and Conclusions of Law, the
Court hereby enters the following Order:
Defendant, Board of Education of Davis County School
District's

Motion

To

Dismiss

For

Lack

of

Subject

Jurisdiction is hereby denied.
DATED this

2 V**- day of February, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

Y:
BY:
FORM AND CONTENT

J/^MARK WARD
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
ATTORNEYS FOR D.C.S.D.
C:\Stl\H,EADIRC\rtTtlttEll.rr2
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Judge Rodney S. PPage
i

Matter

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

day of February,

1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order was deposited in the United States
mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
J. Mark Ward, Esq.
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorney for Defendant Board of Education
of Davis County School District
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Steven B. Smith, Esq.
SCALLEY & READING
Attorney for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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